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Abstract
Innovation, mark-ups and the degree of trade openness vary substantially across sectors. This paper
builds a multi-sector endogenous growth model to study the inuence of asymmetric trade liberali-
sation and sectoral di¤erences in the degree of product market competition on the e¤ect that trade
has on R&D investments at a rm level. I nd that di¤erences in the degree of competition generate
large di¤erences in rm innovative responses to trade liberalisation. A movement from autarky
to free trade promotes innovation and productivity growth in those sectors which are initially less
competitive. However, when the initial tari¤ level is common across sectors, a homogeneous tari¤
reduction promotes innovation in those sectors which are initially more competitive. The paper
suggests that trade liberalisation could be a source of industry productivity divergence: rms that
are located in industries with greater exposure to foreign trade, invest a greater amount in R&D
contributing to industry productivity growth. Finally the paper outlines the importance of reallo-
cation e¤ects within industry and across industries that are the result of these asymmetries. An
asymmetric trade liberalisation has a small but negative impact on aggregate productivity growth.
Keywords: Sectorial productivity, international trade, innovation.
JEL CODES: F12, O43.
1 Introduction
A recent body of theoretical and empirical literature studies the inuence of trade openness and
trade liberalisation on productivity growth. These studies explore the extent to which a larger
degree of trade openness a¤ects the rate of an industrys technological change and ultimately the
evolution of TFP. To address this question, some researchers have relied on endogenous growth
models with imperfect competition and product or process innovation (Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991a)), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b)), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990). Peretto
(2005), Licandro and Navas (2011)), and more recently, rm heterogeneity and industry dynamics
(Atkenson and Burstein (2010), Navas and Sala (2010), Long, Ra¤ and Stahler (2011), Ederignton
and Mc Calman (2007), Impulliti and Licandro (2011), Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2008), Baldwin
and Nicoud (2008)).
These papers focus on the representative sector case, hence di¤erences among sectors and the
interactions that could emerge because of these di¤erences are not explored. Empirical evidence
suggests that industries are not homogenous in two dimensions that are relevant to a rms in-
vestment decision to innovate: the degree of product market competition and the degree of trade
openness. The former is a key determinant of innovation both in early endogenous growth models
(Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)), and more recent contributions (Peretto (1998),
Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2002)). In addition, several papers argue that trade may
increase innovation e¤orts precisely through an increase in competition.1 The latter clearly a¤ects
how rms respond to trade liberalisation. Despite the relevance of these two dimensions, few papers
have investigated the consequences of the existence of these asymmetries for the e¤ect that trade
has on innovation.
INSERT FIGURE (1) HERE
The fact that industries di¤er largely in the degree of product market competition within a
country is a stylized fact well documented in the data (Gri¢ th, Harrison and Simpson (2010),
Eslava, Haltiwanger and Kugler (2009)). For example, Epifani and Gancia (2011) report that in
the US manufacturing sector at a four-digit level of disaggregation, mark-ups vary substantially
across industries. These authors observe that mark-ups vary also across countries (mark-ups are
larger in poor countries) and over time. The degree of trade openness varies substantially across
industries and this is the case even for developed economies. Figure (1) plots an average of trade
barriers faced by di¤erent US manufacturing industries (3-digit NAICS code) during the period
1989-2005 obtained from Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). The gure reveals substantial variation
across industries going from 3% up to 18%. This di¤erence is even larger when we move to more
disaggregated data.
This paper builds a multi-sector endogenous growth model with oligopolistic competition and
private R&D investments to study the e¤ects of trade openness and trade liberalisation policies on
innovation and productivity growth at the industry level. The aim of this paper is to introduce
asymmetries across sectors in both, the degree of product market competition and the degree
1The main mechanism through which trade has an impact on innovation in the above cited papers, is the increase
in competition. This could come through di¤erent channels: An e¤ect through direct changes in the protability
of R&D: Peretto (2005), Licandro and Navas (2011), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) etc.., and an indirect e¤ect
through selection: Competition allows only the most productive rms to survive. The reallocation of market shares
and productive resources towards the incumbents contribute to increase innovation investments. That is the case of
the recent contributions with rm heterogeneity (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008).
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of trade openness, to see how trade a¤ects innovation in the presence of these two sources of
heterogeneity. More precisely, I rst consider the implementation of a common trade policy in an
environment in which industries di¤er in the degree of product market competition. This exercise
enables us to isolate the contribution of sectoral di¤erences in product market competition to the
relationship between trade and innovation. In this exercise, I consider a movement from autarky
to free trade as well as a more realistic partial trade liberalisation via a change in tari¤s. Two
alternative scenarios are considered: exogenous and endogenous di¤erences in the degree of product
market competition. In both scenarios, trade a¤ects innovation through a joint e¤ect of an increase
in market size and an increase in competition. However, the latter will be di¤erent across industries
due to di¤erences in the initial degree of competition. Consequently, the level of competition that the
industry faces initially becomes an important determinant of the nal e¤ect that trade liberalisation
has on innovation.
In a second exercise, I investigate whether asymmetries in the process of trade liberalisation
across sectors generate steady state di¤erences in innovation and productivity growth in otherwise
identical industries. In this case, I isolate the contribution of asymmetric exposure to foreign
trade in the evolution of an industrys TFP. Through this analysis I nd that asymmetric trade
liberalisation has a heterogenous impact. This implies that exposure to foreign trade is a source
of industry productivity divergence. I also show that asymmetric trade liberalisation generates a
small but negative impact on aggregate productivity growth. The model suggests that a common
trade policy across sectors may be benecial since introducing asymmetries across sectors reduces
growth.
The model is based on the framework developed in Licandro and Navas (2011), that explores
the e¤ect of trade liberalisation on innovation and growth through a pro-competitive e¤ect in an
oligopolistic general equilibrium model (OLGE). In this set-up I introduce di¤erences in trade
barriers and the degree of product market competition across industries, considering both a case in
which the latter di¤erences are exogenous and the one in which these di¤erences are endogenous.
Then I undertake counterfactual experiments in the two alternative scenarios, calibrating the model
using data on R&D activities and trade costs from the US manufacturing industries. The rst set of
results considers the case when the number of rms is exogenous, and this allows us to understand
the role played by the pro-competitive e¤ect of trade on the results. The second set of exercises
generalizes the previous results allowing for endogenous market structure. Interestingly, in both
exercises the existence of these two sources of heterogeneity generates substantial reallocation e¤ects.
In the rst case, the reallocation e¤ect is larger between industries while in the second set of results
reallocation is larger across rms and activities within the same industry.
Although, this paper is related to an extensive literature that examines the e¤ects of trade
openness and trade liberalisation on innovation and growth, to the best of my knowledge, this paper
is the rst to study the role of these two sources of heterogeneity across industries in innovation and
industry productivity growth. Two related papers in the area are Impulliti and Licandro (2010)
and Ederignton and Mc Calman (2007). The rst paper introduces rm heterogeneity into the
oligopolistic competition model of Licandro and Navas (2011) to disentangle the e¤ects of trade
openness on industry productivity growth that are derived from selection from the e¤ecs that are
derived from a pure increase in competition. Though their results could be interpreted in terms
of industry heterogeneity, the only source of industry heterogeneity in this model is the initial
productivity and the consequences of the presence of asymmetries in other variables, like the degree
of product market competition or the degree of trade openness, are not explored. Ederignton and
Mc Calman (2007) explore the e¤ect of trade liberalisation on the rate of technology adoption in
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a small open economy. This paper nds that unilateral trade liberalisation is likely to delay the
adoption date for the median rm. This e¤ect depends on several industrial characteristics and
the e¤ect is stronger in, for example, more competitive industries (low entry costs, large domestic
markets). The current paper di¤ers in an important dimension. Their model uses a monopolistic
competition model in partial equilibrium. Thus, the rich interaction across sectors that emerges in
a general equilibrium context and the strategic interaction among rms, which is a crucial element
in our model is not explored.
In addition, few theoretical papers have explored di¤erences in the degree of product market
competition and trade asymmetries when analyzing the impact of trade on aggregate outcomes.
One exception is Epifani and Gancia (2011) which outlines the importance of existing mark-up
di¤erences across sectors, across countries and over time, which causes a misallocation of production
factors. Their paper studies the importance of resource misallocation induced by trade in a static
framework and its implications for welfare. The current study complements this research, as it
outlines the importance of these asymmetries in a dynamic context by studying its consequences
for innovation and growth.
2 The model
Consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of consumers of measure L; with instanta-
neous logarithmic preferences dened over two nal consumption goods X and Y
U(Cx; Cy) =
1Z
0
e t( lnCx + (1  ) lnCy)dt;  > 0;
where Cx; Cy denote respectively the consumption baskets of goods X and Y . Good Y is an
homogeneous good.2 Good X is a di¤erentiated good that takes the following functional form.
Cx =
NY
j=1
(cj)
j ; 0 < j < 1; and
NX
j=1
j = 1: (1)
Here a Cobb-Douglas subutility function between the di¤erent varieties has been assumed with
the parameter j controlling for the weights of each of these goods in a consumers budget. Each of
these varieties consists on a continuum of subvarieties of measure Z that are aggregated following
the standard CES functional form:
cxj =
0@ ZZ
0
c
j
ij di
1A
1
j
; 0  j < 1; (2)
where the parameter j controls for the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The structure
of our economy distinguishes between industries (varieties) and subindustries (subvarieties) where
2The existence of a traditional good allows for the reallocation of labor to the R&D sector without necessarily
reducing the labor that is assigned to the composite good sector. A similar result would hold under the assumption of
elastic labor supply as in the work of Aghion et al. (2001). Although the relationship between trade and employment
is interesting, is not the focus in this paper.
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we have assumed a unitary elasticity of substitution across industries. This preference structure is
needed to ensure the existence of a Balanced Growth Path in which labor allocation across sectors
is constant in an environment in which di¤erences in TFP growth rates across sectors may arise in
the steady state (Ngai and Pissarides (2006)).3 This is going to be the case in this paper.
Each subvariety is produced under Cournot competition4 with a number of rms nj which are
exogenously given.5 Each rm produces according to the following technology:
qlij = zlij l
x
lij ; (3)
where qlij denotes the quantity produced by rm l producing subvariety i in industry j; and zlij
denotes the rms stock of knowledge: Firms can also undertake cost-reducing innovations using
the following technology:
_zlij = Tj
 
lzlij

zlij ;  2 (0; 1) ; (4)
, which depends on the rms stock of knowledge (zlijt), and the resources that are devoted to
innovation, lzlij . In this set-up the stock of knowledge is rm-specic and there are no technological
spillovers among rms. This assumption is made, to perfectly isolate the contribution of the increase
in competition that is derived from trade openness on innovation and productivity from other
sources i.e.international R&D spillovers. Tj is a technological constant, that includes di¤erences in
technological opportunities across sectors.
At any point in time rms producing the subvariety i decide the quantity to supply and the
optimal allocation of workers for both, physical production and R&D, taking into consideration
other rmsstrategies. This game belongs to the family of di¤erential games, or repeated games
dened in continous time, in which past actions a¤ect current payo¤s. Two di¤erent concepts of
Markov perfect Nash equilibria have been proposed in the literature, the open-loop and the closed-
loop Nash equilibrium. In an open-loop Nash equilibrium a rm initially selects the optimal path
of strategies taking the other rmspath of strategies as given and the rm sticks to this path
forever. In this sense an open-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a static Nash equilibrium
in which the possible strategies are time paths of actions and the associated payo¤s are innite
sums of payo¤s. The literature has focused on open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE), mainly because
standard optimal control theory techniques can be applied in order to nd this type of equilibria.
In addition, Licandro and Navas (2011) show that the OLNE equilibria in this game collapse into
the CLNE (closed loop Nash equilibria) being game perfect or time-consistent.
3This assumption simplies calculations. We have explored the role of the elasticity of substitution across indus-
tries and considered a version of this model with an innovation function that presents decreasing returns to scale
in the accumulation of knowledge as in Jones (1995). The advantage of such a framework is that the steady state
productivity growth rate is identical across industries and therefore, the aggregate TFP growth rate is constant inde-
pendently of the elasticity of substitution across products. In this situation trade may generate temporary di¤erences
in productivity growth across sectors but does not generate permanent di¤erences. The model is able to generate
permanent di¤erences in productivity levels across industries although the qualitative results are identical to those
presented further in the paper. (Available upon request).
4Under Cournot competition with rms o¤ering homogeneous goods, the model yields tractable solutions. How-
ever, the results derived in this paper are qualitatively more general, and it allows for alternative market structures
such as: Cournot competition with rms that o¤er imperfect substitutes and Bertrand competition with product
di¤erentiation. (Available upon request).
5This assumption will be relaxed in a further section of the paper.
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The following denition applies for each rm l in the subvariety i of industry j (I omit some
notation for simplication). Let al = [qlT;lzlT ] ; 8 T  t be the strategy of rm l, where [qlT;lzlT ] are
the time-paths of output and R&D workers, and let us denote 
l; as the set of possible strategies
of rm l. Let Vl be the value of rm l when the rm plays the strategy path al and the nj   1 rms
in the market, nj > 2, play strategies a l =

a1; a2; ::::al 1; al+1::::anj
	
Denition 1 At time t, Al = [al ; a

 l] is an open loop Nash equilibrium if,
Vl [Al]  Vi [A0l]  0;
where A0l = [a
0
l; a

 l] ; 8 a0l 6= al; 2 
l; 8l:
This condition implies that the optimal time path of strategies al maximises the value of rm l
taking as given other rmsstrategies, (a l); and that the value of the rm must be non-negative.
2.1 Solving for the autarkic equilibrium
Let Exj denote the expenditure dedicated to consumption of good j and let E
i denote the expen-
diture that is devoted to consumption of the nal goods i = x; y: Consumers solve the standard
optimal control problem whose rst order conditions are as follows6 :
Ex = E; (5)
Ey = (1  )E; (6)
Exj = jE
x; (7)
_E
E
= rt   ; (8)
pj =
LExj
xj
; (9)
pij =

LExj
pjxij
1 j
pj ; (10)
where E is total expenditure in consumption and pj =
 
ZR
0
p
j
j 1
ij di
!j 1
j
; is the standard
aggregate price index.7
6The consumers solve the following optimal control problem:
Max U(Cxt ; C
y
t )
s.t. conditions 1 and 2 and the budget constraint which is given by:
NX
j=1
1Z
0
pijtcijtdi+ C
y
t +
_St = wtLt + St
St are the only nancial assets in this economy. These are shares of the existing rms. We are assuming that to
nance new investments in R&D, rms are creating new shares. In equilibrium the value of these shares is equal
to the expected discounted value of prots of all existing rms in the economy. Therefore, positive prots, which
is going to be an equilibrium feature in the version of the model with exogenous number of rms, are redistributed
across consumers by means of these shares.
7This is the inverse of the standard demand function derived in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework:
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Firm l in subvariety i of industry j solves the problem:
Vlijs = max
Z 1
s
Rs;t

(pij   z 1lij )qlij   lzlij

dt; s.t. (11)
pij =

LExj
pjxij
1 j
pjt
xij =
njX
l=1
qlij (12)
_zlij = Tj(l
z
lij)
zlij ; 0 <  < 1
zlij0 > 0;
where Rs;t = e 
R t
s
rd is the usual market discount factor. I restrict the analysis to symmetric
equilibria by assuming that the initial stock of knowledge is equal for all rms in the same sector
i.e. zlij0 = zij0;8 l. In addition, to ensure simplicity, I assume that the initial productivity is equal
across all rms in the economy. Because I focus on symmetric equilibria I omit the subscript l for
the sake of simplicity. Deriving rst order conditions, rearranging terms and applying symmetry, I
get:
qij = jzij ljE
x
j ; (13)
1 = vijTj(l
z
ij)
 1zij ; (14)
z 2
ij
qij
vij
+ Tj
 
lzij

=
  _vij
vij
+ r; (15)
where vij is the costate associated with variable zj and j  nj 1+jnj is the inverse of the markup
rate. I denote lj as LnjZ :
The left hand side of condition (15) is the marginal gain of accumulating one additional unit of
knowledge, and it can be separated into two parts: the rst consists of the reduction in the marginal
production costs, which are proportional to the quantity supplied, and the second one represents
learning by doing in research. The benet of a cost-reduction innovation depends on the quantity
produced, as it determines the amount of resources that are saved as a result of such a reduction
in production costs.
Given that the quantity that is produced determines innovation e¤ort, the way in which quan-
tities are determined is fundamental for innovation. This is shown in equation (13). In this model,
an increase in the number of rms generates two di¤erent, opposite e¤ects. First, the market share
of each rm declines, as shown in the last term of condition (13), as lj = LnjZ . This is the size e¤ect
or the market share e¤ect. Second, the markup 1j depends positively on the perceived elasticity of
demand which is positively associated with the number of rms and the elasticity of substitution
xij =

LExj
pj

pij
pj
 1
j 1 :
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across varieties.8 An increase in competition, given by an increase in the number of rms or an
increase in the degree of substitutability across products, increases the perceived elasticity of de-
mand. The increase in the perceived elasticity of demand provides an incentive for rms to increase
the quantity supplied. This e¤ect is represented by the rst term on the right hand side of (13).
This is the competition e¤ect.
The set of optimal strategies across varieties depends on their own stock of knowledge and
industry characteristics. Because I have assumed that zij = z0 8 i; j I will also have symmetric
equilibria across all varieties within the same industry and therefore I omit subscript i for notational
convenience.
To complete the model, I must impose the market clearing conditions for all markets. In the
case of the labor market:
NX
j=1
ZZ
0
nj
 
lxij + l
z
ij

di+ Ly = L: (16)
Each nal good market must satisfy that:
Lcij = xij
The nancial market-clearing condition implies that the aggregate asset demand LS is equal to
the stock market value of rms:
LS =
NX
j=1
ZZ
0
njVjdi: (17)
Finally, let us impose the market-clearing condition in sector Y :
LEy = Ly: (18)
2.2 Balanced growth path
A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is an equilibrium path in which variables lxj ; l
z
j ; L
x; Lz; Ly; r; E;Exj ;
Ex; Ey and qy; are constant and qj ; xj ; zj ; vj and pj grow at a constant rate. Next I will show
that a BGP exists and is unique.
Notice that lxj ; l
z
j ; L
y are constant in BGP since they are upper and lower bounded from condition
(16).
Symmetric equilibria imply that qlij = qj; 8i; l: From (12), this implies that xij = xj = njqj : It
follows from (10) that pij = pj : Plugging this in the demand function I obtain, pj =
LExj
Zxj
: Using
the latter, condition 9 and substituting these in (13), yields the following:
pj =
1
j
(zj)
 1
: (19)
8To see this notice that the mark-up j is given by: j =
1
1 ~"j where ~"j is the inverse of the perceived elasticity
of demand ~"j = sj"j where sj is the market share of the rm and "j the inverse of the elasticity of demand (1 j):
An increase in n or an increase in j increases the perceived elasticity of demand.
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Notice that
Znjpjqj =
nj
j
Zlxj : (20)
Using (9) and (7), I obtain :
nj
j
Zlxj =
j
k
nk
k
Zlxk
and then
lxj
lxk
=
j
k
j
k
nk
nj
(21)
The per rm labor demand that is dedicated to production activities is larger in sectors char-
acterised by less competition. However the industry labor demand that is dedicated to production
activities (i.e. Lxj = njZl
x
j ) is larger for more competitive industries. As is standard under Cournot,
rms in sectors that are associated with lower competition produce higher quantities, but the total
production of the sector is lower.9 This implies that the per rm labor demand in the production
sector is larger in those sectors that are less competitive.
Combining (4), (13), (14) and (15), under _lzj = 0, I obtain the following equation
Tj(l
z
j )
 1lxj = : j = 1; 2; :::N (22)
and therefore
Tj(l
z
j )
 1lxj = Tk(l
z
k)
 1lxk 8 j; k.
This is the consequence of the fact that consumers are indi¤erent among the di¤erent R&D
investment opportunities in each sector. In steady state the arbitrage condition implies that the
rate of return of innovation must be equal in all sectors, and equal to the discount rate. Then:
lzj
lzk
=

Tj
Tk
lxj
lxk
 1
1 
(23)
Conditions (21) and (23) reveal the dual nature of our model as a result of a standard mech-
anism in oligopoly models. If I measure competition by measuring the elasticity of substitution
across products, then I nd that as markets become more competitive (products become more
substitutable), each rm produces more, uses more labor in production, and therefore innovates
relatively more. However, if I measure competition by measuring the number of competitors, as mar-
kets become more competitive, each rm produces less, uses less labor in production and therefore
innovates relatively less. According to this measure, lower degrees of product market competition
are associated with relatively greater per-rm resources devoted to R&D. The total industry R&D
expenditure is given by the following:
9Notice that the total labor force that is dedicated to production activities in both sectors is given by:
njXl
x
j
nkXl
x
k
=
j
k
j
k
An increase in the number of rms in sector j increases the allocation of labor to production activities in sector j:
Notice that the aggregate allocation of labor to production activities depends on the degree of competition adjusted
by size (that we will later call ~j):
8
nj l
z
j
nklzk
=

j
k
j
k
nk
nj
Tj
Tk
 1
1  nj
nk
=

nj   1 + j
nk   1 + k
j
k
Tj
Tk
 1
1  nk
nj
 +1
1 
In this context, and for lower values of nj ; a larger number of rms within an industry is
associated with a relatively larger volume of resources devoted to R&D in that industry. 10
To obtain an expression for the equilibrium allocation of workers across activities and sectors,
note:
lxj =

Tj
 
lzj
1 
; (24)
A convenient property of this model is that the steady state solution can be summarised in a
single non-linear equation, as follows: 
(1  ) + ~
~k
!

Tk
(lzk)
1 
+
0@ NX
j=1
 
~j
~k
Tj
Tk
! 1
1  
nk
nj
 
1 
1A lzk = lk (25)
where ~ is a size-weighted average of the degree of competition across sectors
0@i:e: NX
j=1
~j
1A where
~j = jj is a measure of the degree of competition of sector j, weighted by the importance that
sector j has in total expenditure in the manufacturing sector. 11
Notice that _qjqj =
_xj
xj
=
_zj
zj
= Tj
 
lzj
 
and _pjpj =
_vj
vj
=   _zjzj :
The next proposition shows that the BGP exists and is unique.
Proposition 2 A BGP exists and is unique
Proof. The BGP exists if a solution to equation (25) exists. This is due to the fact that all variables
in steady state collapse to some function of lzk and the parameters of the model. Denote the left
hand side of (25) as f(lzk): f(l
z
k) is a continous function in the interval [0; lk] :It is monotonically
increasing in lzk and satises the limit conditions limlzk!0 f(l
z
k) = 0 and limlzk!l f(l
z
k) > lk. Existence
and uniqueness is directly implied by the intermediate value theorem.
Notice that if  = 12 ; j = k and j = k (i.e. nj = nk; j = k); the previous equation is
equal to that derived in Licandro and Navas (2011).
10More precisely, taking the logs of the right hand side expression and di¤erentiating with respect to nj we obtain:
d ln
njl
z
j
nkl
z
k
dnj
= 1
1 
1
nj 1+j  
+1
1 
1
nj
This is larger than zero i¤:
1
j
> 1 + 
This is going to be the case whenever:
nj <
(1 )(1+)

This condition is satised for most of the exercises developed in the calibrated version of the model (section 3).
11Details about the derivation of 25 are provided in the appendix.
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To explore the properties of the model, we observe Panel A in gure (2), which depicts the left
and right hand sides of condition (25) for calibrated parameter values (discussed below) and for the
simple case of two industries that we denote with subscripts 1 and 2. While the LHS part of (25)
is monotonically increasing and concave in the argument lz2; the value of  suggested by the data is
close to zero which makes the function nearly linear.
Notice that an increase in the degree of product market competition induced by an increase in
2 increases the per rm resources dedicated to innovation in industry 2: This is clearly shown in
Panel B of gure (2). The increase in 2 causes an increase in 2 and moves the LHS to the right
(the LHS is monotonically decreasing in 2): When rms face a more elastic-demand they increase
the quantity supplied in the market. The increase in rm-size translates into greater innovation
e¤orts and stimulates plant and industry productivity growth.
However, an increase in the degree of product market competition (measured as an increase in
n2) decreases the per rm resources dedicated to innovation in industy 2: The main di¤erence with
respect to the experiment above is that when we increase n2 the direct e¤ect appears, and moves
the RHS down (Panel C in the same gure). As is standard in the Cournot model, the direct e¤ect
is dominant; therefore an increase in the number of rms translates into a decrease in output per
rm. As rm size decreases, rm level innovation e¤orts decrease.
An increase in the degree of product market competition in industry 1 (measured as an increase
in 1) decreases the rm resources that are dedicated to innovation in industry 2 (Panel D in the
same gure). The increase in 1 causes an increase in 1 moving the LHS into the left. This
reduces innovation e¤orts in industry 2: As industries compete for labor, the increase in e¢ ciency
in industry 1 is associated with a reallocation of resources from the remainder of the industries to
industry 1. Interestingly, this general equilibrium e¤ect is shaped by the importance of industry 1
in the consumers budget (1) : As 1 approaches to zero, this e¤ect will be negligible.
Technological opportunities also play an interesting role in determining rms innovation ef-
forts in sector 2: The increase in R&D productivity in sector 2 increases innovation e¤orts but is
detrimental to other sectors.
Therefore, in autarky, the increase in product market competition produces an ambiguous e¤ect
on innovation e¤orts and industry productivity growth. This ambiguity results from the fact that
when the number of rms increases the size e¤ect appears. In the next section I explore what
happens when the economy opens to trade and we will see how this size e¤ect is compensated by an
increase in the market size of the rm. The introduction of asymmetries across industries generates
an interesting reallocation of resources towards production and innovation in some industries that
ultimately a¤ect the industry both statically, through a change in the quantity produced and
dynamically favoring industry productivity growth in some industries to the detriment of other
industries.
INSERT FIGURE (2) HERE
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2.3 Free trade
Assume that the economy is open to trade with M identical economies. To serve a foreign market,
rms pay a transportation cost of the iceberg type (i.e rms need to ship (1 +  j) units of the
good to get one unit potentially sold abroad). Denote by qlij the quantity that rm l producing
subvariety i in sector j produces in its local market and with qmlij denote the quantity that each
rm l in in sector j supplies to country m: Since I assume that all countries are identical, I will
again focus on symmetric equilibrium.
Firms solve the following optimisation problem:
Vlijs = max
Z 1
s
Rs;t
"
(pij   z 1lij )qlij +
MX
m=1
(pmij   z 1lij (1 +  j))qmlij   Lzlij
#
dt; (26)
s:t:pij =

LExj
pjxij
1 j
pj
pmij =
 
LExj
pmj x

ij
!1 j
pmj (27)
xij = x
m
ij =
njX
l=1
qlij +
MX
m=1
njX
l=1
qmlij
_zlij = Tj(l
z
lij)
zlij ; 0 <  < 1
zlij0 > 0;
I focus on a symmetric Nash equilibrium where qlij and qmlij are equal for all rms within the
same sector in all countries but di¤er across sectors and across destinations (i.e, .qlij = qj ,.qmlij = q

j
8 l  n ,8i ;8 m  M , and qj 6= qj ): I obtain the following rst order conditions:
 
LExj
nj(qj +Mqj )pj
!1 
pj
 
1  (1  j)qj
nj(qj +Mqj )
!
= z 1j (28)
 
LExj
nj(qj +Mqj )pj
!1 
pj
 
1  (1  j)q

j
nj(qj +Mqj )
!
= z 1j (1 +  j) (29)
1 = vijTj(l
z
j )
 1zj ; j = 1; 2 (30)
z 2j
 
qj +M(1 +  j)q

j

vij
+
 
lzj

Tj =
  _vij
vij
+ r; j = 1; 2 (31)
Firms consider the total volume of production when selecting the amount of resources to devote
to R&D. Dividing (28) and (29) I obtain the following equation:
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(nj   1  j)qj +Mnjqj
njqj + (Mnj   1  j)qj
=
1
1 +  j
I simplify the equation as follows:
qj =
(1 +  j) (1  j)   jnj
1  j +Mnj j qj (32)
(32) implies an interesting result. Manipulating (32) I deduce that if  j  1 jnj 1+j ; then qj = 0:
Unlike the monopolistic competition model where the CES preference structure ensures that all
rms have positive trade ows independently of the trade cost, trade exists in this economy if and
only if trade costs are not excessively high. This is the consequence of the fact that foreign goods
and home goods are perfect substitutes. Therefore, a su¢ cient and necessary condition for foreign
rms to survive in a local market is that the cost disadvantage that is introduced by transportation
costs is not too large. 12 Substituting in 28, yields:
qj =
(nj   1  j) +Mnj

(1+j)(1 j) jnj)
1 j+Mnjj

nj

1 +M

(1+j)(1 j) jnj)
1 j+Mnjj
2 zjtljExj
I simplify the equation as follows:
qj =
((1 +M)nj   1 + j))(1  j +M jnj)
nj(1  j) (1 +M(1 +  j))2
zjtljE
x
j
and substituting in 32
qj =
((1 +M)nj   1 + j) ((1 +  j) (1  j)   jnj))
nj(1  j)(1 +M(1 +  j))2 zj ljE
x
j
and then, I express total output per rm Qj = qj +M(1 +  j)qj as
Qj = 
0
jzj ljE
x
j
where
0j =
((1 +M)nj   1 + j)

(1 M + 2M(1 +  j)) (1  j) + 2j (1  j   nj)

nj(1  j)(1 +M(1 +  j))2 (33)
It can be shown (see the appendix) that the steady state solution of the model can be summed
up by the following equation:
12 In this model, foreign rms serve the domestic market despite this disadvantage in costs. This feature is unique
under Cournot competition and appears to be paradoxical, as foreign rms are more ine¢ cient than domestic rms
when serving a local market. However, foreign rms have a particular advantage over potential local entrants because
they are incumbents. This could be because there are institutional or technological barriers that limit entry.
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(1  ) + ~0
~
0
k
!

Tk
(lzk)
1 
+
0@ NX
j=1
 
~
0
j
~
0
k
Tj
Tk
! 1
1  
nj
nk
 
1 
1A lzk = lk (34)
where ~
0
k = k
0
k and ~ =
NX
j=1
j
0
j : This condition is analogous to the one in autarky but with
the new value for the parameter 0j :
In the appendix, I show that 0j > j : Licandro and Navas (2011) also reveal that a movement
from autarky to free trade, or a trade liberalisation (understood as a decrease in transportation
costs) increases employment in the R&D sector, and this increased employment has positive e¤ects
on innovation and productivity growth in a situation with perfect symmetry across sectors. The
focus of this paper is to demonstrate how the situation changes when we allow for sectoral di¤erences
(in this context, di¤erences in competition levels) or when we have a process of trade liberalisation
that is not symmetric across sectors. I rely on numerical methods to demonstrate these results.
3 Results I: Exogenous Number of rms.
In this section I assess the importance of di¤erences in exposure to foreign trade or in the degree
of product market competition on the e¤ect that trade openness has on innovation for the simple
case where the number of rms is exogenous. To do so, I rst calibrate the main parameters of
the model using data for the US economy. Secondly, I carry out several counterfactual exercises to
explore the impact of these asymmetries in the e¤ect that trade openness has on innovation.
The structural parameters that I calibrate in this section are ; ; L; ; Z and Tj . In steady
state ; the traditional discount factor, is equal to the real interest rate (logarithmic intertemporal
preferences). I use an average of the long-term interest rate for the US economy provided by the
World Bank Development Indicators which is 0.0375. The parameter  measures the weight of
the di¤erentiated sector in total expenditures. I exclude the production of services in the analysis
because of the special characteristics of this sector.13 I consider the manufacturing sector to be the
di¤erentiated sector of the economy. The World Development Indicators database from the World
Bank computes the value added of the manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP. Manufacturing
represents 25% of the total GDP for the US economy which implies a share of 91% of the total
GDP net services. This justies a value for the parameter  of 0:91:
It remains to x the parameters , L;Z and Tjt:  measures the degree of decreasing labor returns
in the R&D sector. To obtain reasonable values for this parameter, I rely on Ngai and Samaniego
13The Service sector accounted for 72% of the US GDP in 2011. However, most of the products that are included
in this sector are non-tradable by nature. When examining the standard index of trade openness (Exports+Imports)
GDP
at the sectoral level we nd that trade in services is responsible for just 8% of the value of the production of the
sector. Conversely, trade in merchandise (manufacturing+agricultural goods) accounts for 73% of the value of the
production of manufactured and agricultural goods in the US. Because we have not included a non-tradable sector
in our economy it seems reasonable to exclude the service sector from the numerical analysis.
13
(2010) that explores the main determinants of di¤erences in long run industry productivity growth
rates. Their work suggests a value of  = 0:08. 14 Given that it is not a calibrated parameter, I
will perform robustness checks for this parameter.15
In this section, I consider that the technological constant, Tj ; is common across sectors. This
will provide a better picture of how di¤erences in the two dimensions I explore a¤ect innovation.16
From equation (24), It is the case that:
Tj =
nj l
z
j
nj lxj


 
lzj
 
With  very close to zero, which is the case in this paper, the third term can be ignored, and
this technological constant can be proxied as follows: T = 
Lz
Lx
: To calibrate this parameter, I
rely on the share of the labor force devoted to R&D activities provided by the National Science
Foundation. While in the next section I will exploit the variability across industries, in this section
I use the average share that it is 4.43%.17 This implies that the technological constant should take
the value: T = 0:020:18
Because in this model the population is identical to the labor force, L, I proxy for this parameter
by using the size of the US labour force. I adjust the size of the labor force by the average number
of products per industry and therefore I consider a value for (L=Z) equal to 77750.
In this section I assume the simplest case in which there are only two di¤erentiated industries
(N = 2): In our rst counterfactual exercise, I assume that both industries are equal in all dimen-
sions except in the degree of Product Market Competition. More precisely, Industry 1 has initially
2 rms per product.19 Industry 2, however, has a varying number of rms per product which goes
from 2 to 6.20 When both industries have the same number of rms there are no di¤erences in
Product Market Competition. If the number of rms in Industry 2 is larger than 2, then there
would be di¤erences in competition,with Industry 2 being the most competitive one. In these dif-
ferent scenarios, in our rst experiment I consider a common trade policy which consists of either
a movement from autarky to free trade or a tari¤ reduction. This allows us to isolate the e¤ect of
di¤erences in the degree of Product Market Competition, on the impact that trade liberalisation
has on innovation. I consider for simplicity that j = 0:5; j = 0 and M = 1:
21
INSERT FIGURE (3)HERE
14These authors use a richer but similar innovation function. In their paper, new knowledge is entirely produced
using an intermediate research input. The elasticity of new knowledge to this intermediate research input is equal to
0.13. This research intemediate good is produced with physical capital and labor using a Cobb-Douglas technology.
The Intermediate inputs labor share is 0.6. The elasticity of R&D to research labor is therefore  = 0:60:13 = 0:078:
15A Robustness check for this parameter is available by request.
16This assumption, however will be relaxed in a later section of the paper.
17That is around 1% of the total labor force.
18More precisely
 
1
50

:
19 I choose a number of rms n = 2 in industry 1 for simplicity.
20Given the parameter conguration, six is the maximum number of rms per industry, compatible with positive
prots in equilibrium when the number of trade partners is equal to one.
21Robustness checks are provided by request.
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Figure (3) shows how a movement from autarky to free trade alters the per-rm innovation
e¤orts in industries 1 and 2, respectively. When there are no di¤erences in competition, R&D
employment increases by 6% as a consequence of trade openness. However, if Industry 2 is more
competitive, trade openness increases R&D employment to a greater extent in the less competitive
industry. Moreover, if the di¤erences in competition are large enough, the per-rm investment in
R&D in industry 2 falls as a consequence of trade liberalisation. This result is the combination of
two di¤erent e¤ects: the competition e¤ect and the general equilibrium e¤ect; the increase in the
perceived elasticity of demand is larger for sectors that are initially less competitive in autarky. This
is a standard feature in oligopolistic competition models. The latter implies that trade intensies
competition to a greater degree in those sectors. As a result, rms increase the volume of production
and the investment in research to a greater extent in those sectors. As the labor demand increases to
a greater extent in the less competitive sector, general equilibrium e¤ects induce a labor reallocation
from the most competitive industry to the less competitive one.
INSERT FIGURE (4)HERE
Figure (4), shows the impact of a reduction in variable trade barriers. For this section, I set
the initial variable trade cost  = 0:08 which is very close to the average variable trade cost for
the US manufacturing sector computed in Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). 22 Panel A shows
the variation in percentage points of R&D employment in sector 1 while panel B presents the same
results for sector 2. Contrary to our previous case, when there are di¤erences in competition,
the larger increase in R&D employment following trade liberalisation appears to be in the most
competitive industry. Moreover, R&D could fall in the initially less competitive industry. To explain
this result, it is useful to plot the change in  after the tari¤ reduction across di¤erent initial degrees
of competition as shown below. Figure 5 displays the value of  under two di¤erent tari¤ levels,
 = 0:08; and  = 0 and for di¤erent degrees of competition. Notice that the variation in  following
trade liberalisation is stronger when the industry is more competitive. The main reason for this
result lies in the upper bound tari¤ level . When  =  the open economy collapses to the
autarkic one.  is decreasing with the number of rms. Thus for a given  ; a larger number of
rms indicates that the industry is closer to an autarkic situation and therefore relatively less open
to foreign trade. The same trade policy will increase competition and consequently innovation in
the most competitive industry or the industry relatively less open to trade.
In our second counterfactual exercise I assess the impact of asymmetric trade liberalisation. To
do so, I consider an initial situation in which both industries are exactly identical. However, a trade
policy will be implemented in Industry 1 but will not be implemented in Industry 2.23
INSERT FIGURE (6) HERE
Figure (6) shows the variation in percentage points in per rm R&D-employment in both the
liberalized industry (industry 1) and the non-liberalized industry. Each line represents the results
for a di¤erent initial degree of competition (number of rms) which becomes larger as the line
moves to the right. The OY axis shows the variation in percentage points in R&D employment
22The average across sectors is 7.57%. The next section uses an upgraded version of the database built in Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2006), to obtain values for the variable trade cost at a sectoral level.
23While earlier versions of this paper consider both a movement from autarky to free trade and an undercut tari¤s,
I am going to consider only the second one due to similarity and space constraints. The other gure is available by
request.
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compared with the initial situation with 8% trade costs. The OX axis shows the di¤erent values
that trade barriers in Industry 1 can take. R&D employment increases in the liberalized industry
and decreases in the non-liberalized industry. The largest increase in R&D employment is obtained
when there are no trade barriers in Industry 1, and this increase varies from 0.3 (with two rms
in each industry) to almost 1% (with six rms). Larger tari¤ reductions are associated with larger
increases in R&D employment, although the function is concave. Trade liberalisation enhances
productivity growth in those industries which liberalize, but it has a non-linear e¤ect. The e¤ect
is stronger when those industries are relatively more closed to foreign trade.
To summarise, this analysis shows how initial di¤erences in the degree of Product Market Com-
petition a¤ect the e¤ect that a common trade policy has on innovation across industries. In the
case of a partial trade liberalisation policy, a reduction in tari¤s intensies competition to a greater
extent in those industries that are initially more competitive. Consequently, rmssize and R&D
e¤orts increase in these industries. The fact that all sectors are competing for the same rival inputs
implies that the reduction in tari¤s in this context may reallocate productive resources towards the
more competitive industries.
This analysis also shows that asymmetric trade liberalisation contributes to industry produc-
tivity divergence. The reduction in tari¤s increases competition in these industries leading to an
increase in rms size and R&D e¤orts. The competition for labor across industries implies a
reallocation e¤ect from those industries that liberalize more to those industries that stay more
protected.
In the next section I show the extent to which these results are reinforced in a more general
case in which initial di¤erences in the degree of Product Market Competition are endogenous.
4 Endogenous Number of rms
In this section I endogenise the number of rms in the analysis. While the previous assumption
simplies substantially the computations, it leaves aside one interesting mechanism through which
trade contributes to innovation: the "selection e¤ect". The increase in competition from foreign
markets reduces mark-ups. At the current number of rms, this implies that prots will be negative.
The number of rms serving each market falls until the zero prot condition holds again. The
market share of the newly inactive rms is reallocated towards the incumbents and this may provide
additional incentives to these rms to engage in more innovation. The way in which I take into
account the selection e¤ect in this paper di¤ers substantially from current models of trade with
rm heterogeneity: Since all rms are identical , the model does not provide a criteria ny which
rms will remain inoperative. It may be also the case that the size of this selection e¤ect di¤er
substantially across both frameworks.24
24To the best of my knowledge, there are only two relevant papers that incorporate the selection e¤ect in an
oligopolistic model with rm heterogeneity and innovation. The rst one is Impulliti and Licandro (2012). In their
model, they have two selection e¤ects: The selection e¤ect within varieties, which is identical to the one in this model
and selection across varieties. Since in their model rms producing the same variety are identical, they also do not
consider the e¤ect of selection in an environment in which heterogenous rms produce the same variety. The other
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To do so, I assume that each rm pays a per period xed cost of in terms of the numeraire fj .
The two main modications with respect to the above model are, rstly, the labor market condition:
NX
j=1
ZZ
0
nj
 
lxij + l
z
ij + fj

di+ Ly = L: (35)
and secondly the new zero prot condition which determines the mass of active rms per product.
Firstly, obtaining an expression for a rms prots:
ijt = pjtqjt   lxjt   lzjt   fj
I set it equal to zero. Substituting the expression for a rms ´revenue, and rearranging terms
yields: 
1  j
j

lxj = l
z
j + fj (36)
Notice that prots do not depend on the variety subscript and therefore, they are common
across varieties. Substituting 36 into 16 and rearranging terms yields:
lxk = kklk
and
lxj = jj lj :
Substituting in the prot function, using (24) and rearranging terms:
 (1  j)j lj  



Tj (1  j)j lj
 1
1 
= fj :
That is a non-linear equation in nj : The case of free trade is analogous and therefore:

 
1  0j

j lj  



Tj
 
1  0j

j lj
 1
1 
= fj
5 Results II Endogenous Number of Firms
In this section I rst calibrate the model according to the US manufacturing industries at a 3-digit
code level of disaggregation. Secondly, I undertake analogous counterfactual exercises to section
3 that give us an idea of how the two sources of heterogeneity, product market competition and
exposure to foreign trade, would a¤ect innovation in the US manufacturing industries.25
paper Long, Ra¤ and Stahler (2010) incorporates a selection e¤ect along the lines discussed above. Their model
however is static, and this simplies the analysis at some expenses. In addition, they do not explore di¤erences across
industries.
25 I use a 3-digit code level of disaggregation because this is the nest level for which the share of the labor force
engaged in R&D activities across industries is available.
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In these exercises I have relaxed the assumption that there were no di¤erences in technological
opportunities across sectors and I have calibrated Tj using data on the share of the labor force that
was engaged in R&D activities in 2004 at an industry level obtained from the National Science
Foundation (NSF). The remaining parameters are  j ; fj ;M; j and j :
For the volume of trade costs  j ; I have used an upgraded version of the database constructed
by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). In that paper, the authors compute the value of duties and
transportation costs for each of the 6-digit code US manufacturing industries using the underlying
product-level US import data compiled by Feenstra (1996). To obtain an aggregate measure of the
trade costs for each of the 3-digit code industries, I take for each year a weighted average of the
trade costs for each of the 6 digit-code products using the import shares as weights. I compute for
each industry an average of trade costs for the period 1989-2005.
In this model, the existence of xed operational costs determines the number of rms active
in each industry. To the best of my knowledge there is no reliable data on xed operational costs
at an industry level. To proxy this parameter, I use an average of the xed costs obtained from
the World Bank Doing Business Database built initially by Djankov, Laporta and Lopez de Silanes
(2002), which measures for each country, the cost of starting-up a business. For the case of the US
it takes, on average, 6 procedures to start-up a business with a total cost of 6 working days and a
monetary cost of 1% the countrys GDP p.c. This gives us a total cost of 1146$. Since in our model
there is no exit, I assume that the entry cost is paid in a per period xed cost of fj = rfe; so this
gives us a xed cost of 43$. In the calibration exercise, variation across industries in the degree of
product market competition comes from di¤erences in technological opportunities (Tj) and trade
costs across sectors ( j).
I set the parameter M = 1; considering that the economy is open with a symmetric economy.26
For the case of j ; I consider a simple case in which j = 0; and I set the share of expenditure
devoted to each manufacturing sector to be equal across sectors.27
The calibration exercise provides a number of rms per product and consequently a measure of
the product market competition in the industry. To assess the model t, I have obtained measures
of the average mark-ups for each 3-digit-code NAICS manufacturing industry using the NBER pro-
ductivity Database by Bartelsman, Becker and Gray (2000). This database contains information
about the value of shipments, production costs and TFP measures for the US manufacturing indus-
tries at a 6-digit-code level of disaggregation. To compute the mark-ups I have used the standard
measure in the literature: =vship prodc:prodc: :
28 To aggregate across industries I have taken a weighted
26The majority of US rms do not export. From those which export a substantial number of them export only
to one destination (Bernard, Jensen, Eaton and Kortum (2003)). A robustness check related to this parameter is
provided under request.
27Robustness checks on these parameters are available from the author upon request.
28 In the production costs I have used labor costs (to which I have added an estimated cost of social security
expenditure paid by the employer), materials (which include intermediate inputs and energy) and capital costs. For
computing the capital costs I have used the capital stocks provided in the data. For the user cost of capital, I have
considered the standard measure rt+; where rt is the long-term real interest rate and  is the depreciation cost. For
the latter I have distinguished between equipments (with a depreciation rate of 10%) and plants (with a depreciation
rate of 5%). To compute the capital expenditures I have used the lagged value of the capital stock as suggested in
Epifani and Gancia (2011).
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average for each year where I use the share of the value of shipments as weights. To compare the
model with the data I have used an average over the whole sample period (1958-2009).
INSERT FIGURE (7) HERE
Figure (??) shows how the model ts the data. Panel A plots the actual versus estimated
measure of product market competition. On average mark-ups are relatively well predicted by
the model (the average mark-up predicted by the model was 12.67% while the average mark-up
obtained in our sample was 19.59%). The standard deviation however reveals that in our model
there is substantially less variation as compared to the real value (0.0460 vs 0.1061). The correlation
coe¢ cient between both series is positive but not so strong. The data suggests that the model does
a relatively good job in matching the average but it only performs satisfactorily in terms of the
variability. It is very likely that the latter is the result of the fact that the xed operational costs
do not vary in our sample. Panel B in the same gure shows how the model ts the share of the
labor force engaged in R&D activities. In this case the model performs extraordinarily well both
in average and in the variability.
To make our results comparable to the previous section I carry out two analogous counterfactual
exercises. In the rst exercise I compare the calibrated US economy with a hypothetical identical
economy that faces a common trade barrier across sectors. The latter is equal to the average trade
barrier of the US manufacturing industry obtained from the data. With this counterfactual exercise
I am measuring indirectly the consequences of asymmetric trade liberalisation by comparing the
US economy with what the US economy would look like if trade barriers were common across all
manufacturing industries.
INSERT FIGURE (8) HERE
Figure (8) shows how the degree of competition across industries di¤ers in both economies.
In panel A we observe the change in the domestic number of rms between both scenarios. In
those industries where trade barriers are above the average, the number of rms is larger while
the reverse happens in those industries where tari¤s are below the average. This implies that in a
hypothetical movement to a common tari¤, the number of rms would decline (increase) in those
industries whose tari¤s are above (below) the average. However, markups would fall (increase) in
those industries whose tari¤s are above (below) the average, as panel B shows. This suggests that
trade would intensify competition in those industries that su¤er from a reduction in tari¤s. The
e¤ect is more intense the larger the tari¤ change.
INSERT FIGURE (9) HERE
Figure (9) reveals that labor in production and R&D activities would change substantially across
industries. Panel A reveals that the labor force engaged in these activities would increase in those
industries that su¤ers from a decline in trade barriers and the opposite would happen in those
industries for which trade barriers increase. The industry that would enjoy the largest increase is
the leather and allied products industry (code 316) whose labor in R&D activities could increase
by 33.18%. In contrast, the transportation equipment manufacturing industry (code 336) would
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su¤er from the largest fall (5.80%). The e¤ect is also stronger the larger the change in tari¤s, and
the larger the initial number of rms.29
Panel D in gure (9) suggests a very interesting result and this di¤ers from the case with an
exogenous number of rms. Almost all of the reallocation of labor that we have observed in the
previous gure is not coming from a reallocation of labor across industries but from a reallocation
across activities within an industry. That is, in industries where the trade costs decrease, the
number of rms falls, and labor would be reallocated towards the incumbent rms. The opposite
would happen in industries where the trade costs would increase. The model also suggests that the
change in tari¤s generates a reallocation e¤ect from production to innovation activities. Although
reallocation across manufacturing industries is negligible, the total labor force would still increase
(decrease) in industries where trade barriers would decrease (increase).
The large changes in the labor force across industries would generate however limited changes
in industry productivity growth. This is the consequence of the large decreasing returns in labor
associated with R&D activities suggested by the data.30 Though small, a movement towards a
unique tari¤ would increase aggregate productivity growth. 31
In the second counterfactual exercise, I compared our previous economy (with an average trade
cost of 7.57%) with an identical one in which there are no trade barriers. Since initial tari¤s are
identical across industries but industries di¤er in the degree of Product Market Competition, this
exercise is the equivalent of our rst experiment in the previous section.
INSERT FIGURE (10) HERE
In panel A of gure (10) I show how the number of rms would change in a hypothetical
situation in which there are no trade barriers. Industries would be less populated. The reduction
in the number of rms would be stronger in the initially more competitive industries, or those
relatively less open to foreign trade. Panel B shows that the decline in markups would be also
stronger in those industries which are initially more competitive, consistent with the conclusions in
the previous section.
INSERT FIGURE (??) HERE
29For example, the Computer and Electronic Industry (code 334) su¤ers from one of the largest tari¤ cuts, however,
the industry is one of the less competitive (at a local level) and consequently the change in the labor force in R&D
activities is relatively small 1.30%). These results goes in line with the ones derived in the analogous case with
exogenous number of rms.
30For example, in the leather industry (316) the increase in the labor force is translated into an increase in the
industry productivity growth of 0.022 percentage points. In the transportation industry (336) industry productivity
growth would fall by 0.015 points
31Since the expenditure shares on the di¤erent goods are constant we can approximate aggregate productivity
growth by _z
z
= 
NX
j=1
j
zj
zj
: A movement to a common tari¤ increases aggregate productivity growth by 0.0004
percentual points. This tiny e¤ect is due to the fact that the data suggests very low levels for : On average labor
in R&D activities increases as a consequence of a common tari¤ policy by 3.79%.
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The movement towards free trade would bring a substantial reallocation of the labor force
towards production and innovation, but this increase would not be equally shared across all man-
ufacturing industries. More precisely the most competitive industries would experience a larger
increase in the labor force (panels A in gure (??)).32 Again, this reallocation would be stronger in
innovation activities (Panel B in the same gure). Interestingly, the e¤ect on per rm TFP growth,
though small is asymmetric across industries favoring, however, those industries which are initially
less competitive (Panel C in the same gure). The reason behind this result underlies on the fact
that the initially less competitive industries are also the ones in which rms are more productive
in R&D activities.
The previous reallocation e¤ects across industries also have an impact on industry productivity
growth. Although the trade policy has brought productivity growth to all industries, the increases
are small but vary substantially across industries (ranging from 0.0053 percentage points to 0.0187
percentage points). Aggregate productivity growth would increase by 0.0116 points.
6 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial variation in mark-ups, across industries. In
addition, industries are not equally exposed to foreign trade. In this paper, I explore how these
two sources of heterogeneity across industries a¤ect the impact that trade liberalisation has on
innovation. To do so, I consider a multi-sector endogenous growth model with oligopolistic com-
petition in which rms undertake innovation. Then, I calibrate the model using data from the US
manufacturing industries and I undertake two counterfactual exercises in which I isolate each of the
dimensions: The degree of product market competition and the degree of trade openness.
I nd that an industrys degree of product market competition is a key determinant of the
impact of trade on innovation. A movement from autarky to free trade will increase innovation
e¤orts in those industries which are initially less competitive. This is the consequence of the fact
that the increase in competition coming from foreign markets is tougher in industries which are
initially less competitive. However, when considering a common reduction in tari¤s in industries
which start with the same tari¤ level, innovation and industry productivity growth increase in those
industries that are initially more competitive. This is the consequence of the fact that, for the same
tari¤ level, an industry which is initially more competitive is relatively more closed to foreign trade
and therefore competition intensies more in those industries. In both cases, tougher competition
increases rms size and promotes innovation in those industries and it generates a reallocation
of productive resources towards these industries. When I allow for endogenous number of rms,
the same competition e¤ect reduces the mass of active rms by more in those industries. This
generates a reallocation of market shares and productive resources towards incumbents that further
contributes to innovation. Interestingly, when the number of rms is endogenous, the reallocation
of productive resources occurs across activities within the same industry, but there is almost no
reallocation across industries.
32That is the case of The Wood Product Manufacturing Industry whose labor force increases by 11.50%.
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I nd also that an asymmetric trade liberalisation policy generates substantially di¤erent e¤ects
on innovation across industries. Innovation increases in those industries that cut tari¤s and the
latter is larger in those industries that benet from a larger tari¤ cut. This comes from the fact that
a tari¤ reduction increases competition and this increases rmssize and innovation e¤orts. The
larger the tari¤ reduction, the larger the increase in competition and consequently the larger the
e¤ect on innovation. This result is reinforced under the presence of endogenous di¤erences in the
degree of product market competition because the reduction in tari¤s reduces the mass of active
rms in the industry. Market shares and productive resources are reallocated towards the surviving
rms which serves to increase rmssize and innovation e¤orts. Finally, I nd that asymmetric
trade liberalisation has a negative but limited impact on aggregate productivity growth. Moving
to a common tari¤ consequently increases aggregate productivity growth.
The counterfactual exercises suggest that the reallocation e¤ects across activities within an
industry following a movement towards a unique tari¤ may be important. However, these exercises
also suggest that these reallocation e¤ects have a limited but varied e¤ect on industry productivity
growth. The change may vary from a modest increase in 0.02 percentual points in the industry
which enjoys a larger increase in R&D employment to a modest decrease in 0.015 points in the
industry that su¤ers from the largest fall. A movement towards free trade would promote limited
industry productivity growth across all industries but the e¤ect will be larger in the initially more
competitive industries. In these industries the increase could be of a size of approximately 0.02
percentual points.
This paper could be extended in two directions. The rst one could include rm heterogeneity
and investigate how between industry heterogeneity in these two dimensions and within industry
heterogeneity interplays on the e¤ect that trade has on average productivity and innovation. The
second one could explore recent episodes of unilateral trade liberalisation policies in a model that
allows for asymmetries across countries. Given that unilateral trade liberalisation policies have
been increasing in the last decade (Baldwin (2010)), this seems to be a promising area for future
research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of equations 25 and 34
8.1.1 Autarky (Equation 25)
Condition (34) comes from the labor market condition:
NX
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x
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nj l
z
ijdi+ L
y
t = L: (37)
From the production function I have that
lxij = z
 1
ij qij
and substituting (13) under symmetric equilibria I have that:
lxij = z
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(38)
that under the symmetric equilibrium only depends on industry and not rm characteristics.
This implies that
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x: The latter leads to,
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Since in steady state lxjt; l
z
jt L
y
t are constant I omit subscript t for notational clarity. From (5),
(6) and (18):
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Notice that from (20) (the corresponding one to sector k):
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To get an expression for total labor in R&D I use
Lz =
NX
j=1
ZR
0
nj l
z
ijdi = Z
0@ NX
j=1
nj l
z
j
1A = NX
j 6=k
nj

lxj
lxk
Tj
Tk
 1
1 
+nkl
z
k =
0@ NX
j 6=k
nj

~j
~k
nk
nj
Tj
Tk
 1
1 
+ nk
1A lzk
and working through this expression I get:
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Substituting the previous expressions in (16) and dividing both sides by Znk I get:0@ (1  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8.1.2 Free trade (Equation 34)
For free trade I proceed as above, realizing that lxj = z
 1(qj +M(1 +  j)qj )
lxj = z
 1
j 
0
jzj ljE
x
j =
0j
nj
jLE
x (39)
so following the previous steps, replacing j by 
0
j leads to the same expression.
8.2 Proof that 0j  j
The proof consists on showing that 0j  j = 4  0:
From (33) and the denition of  in the autarkic economy, the following expression is obtained.
4 = ((1+M)nj 1+j)[(1 M+2M(1+j))(1 j)+M
2
j (1 j nj)]
nj(1 j)(1+M(1+j))2  
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Rearranging terms:
4 = (1 j)(1+M(1+j))[M((1+j)(1 j) jnj)]+[Mj((1 j)+j(1 j nj))]((1+M)nj 1+j)nj(1 j)(1+M(1+j))2
and manipulating the previous expression I get:
4 = M((1+j)(1 j) jnj)[(1 j)(1 j+M(1+j))+j((1+M)nj ]nj(1 j)(1+M(1+j))2
Notice that the second element of the numerator is positive if exports are positive. The third
term is always positive so I can conclude that this expression is always positive, provided that
exports are positive. It would be zero i¤:  j = j ; M = 0: If  j = 0; This expresssion is reduced to
0j   j = M(1 j)nj(1+M) : Notice that this expression is increasing in M which implies that the larger the
number of trade partners the greater the increase in competition but it is concave in M revealing
that the increase in the number of trade partners has diminishing e¤ects on competition. This
expression is decreasing in nj and the elasticity of substitution j reecting that the larger the
competition levels in autarky, the lower the increase in competition coming from trade openness,
and therefore the lower is the industry productivity growth rate.
9 Figures
Figure 1: Average Trade Costs for the US manufacturing industries for the period (1989-2005).
Source: Authors calculations based on Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006)
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Figure 2: The model in autarky
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Figure 3: Exogenous number of rms: Di¤erences in he degree of Product Market Competition
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Figure 4: Exogenous number of rms. Di¤erences in the degree of PMC. Tari¤ Cuts
29
2 3 4 5 6
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
Degree of competition under different trade scenarios sector 2
number of firms sector 2
te
ta
2
Figure 5: PMC across di¤erent tari¤ levels. Varying number of rms.
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Panel A: Employment in R&D sector 1
Trade costs sector 1
R
&D
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ec
to
r 1
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Panel B: Employment in R&D sector 2
Trade costs sector 1
R
&D
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ec
to
r 2
Figure 6: Asymmetric trade liberalisation. Exogenous number of rms
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Figure 7: Data Fit. Panel A refers to Mark-ups (Average: 12.67% ) vs. Predicted Mark-ups
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Figure 8: The impact of a common tari¤ on competition. Changes in trade barriers are measured in
percentual points. Changes in the number of rms or in the mark-ups are expressed in percentual
changes.
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Figure 9: The impact of a common tari¤ policy on rm and industry characteristics. Changes
in trade barriers and in TFP growth are in percentual points. Changes in the labor force are
percentual changes.
33
2 3 4 5 6 7
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
Initial number of firms
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
irm
s
Panel A: Change in the number of firms
2 3 4 5 6 7
-1
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Initial Number of firms
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 M
ar
k-
up
s
Panel B: Change in Markups
Figure 10: The e¤ects of a movement from a common tari¤ to free trade on competition. Changes
are in percentual points.
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Figure 11: The e¤ects of a movement from a common tari¤ to free trade. Changes in TFP growth
and the industry labor force are in percentual points. Changes in the labor force are percentual
changes.
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